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Who Says There’s No Disclosure Requirement For All Intellectual Property Law Subjects:   
The Case For The Existence Of Disclosure Requirements in Copyright and  
Trademark Law? 
I. Introduction 
Intellectual property is different from tangible, real property, and possession of 
intellectual property is easily disseminated.  Thomas Jefferson explained the ease by which 
intellectual property can spread.  Jefferson said in his writings: 
“an individual may exclusively possess [an idea] as long as he keeps it to 
himself; but the moment it is divulged, it forces itself into the possession 
of everyone, and the receiver cannot dispossess himself of it.  Its peculiar 
character, too, is that no one possesses the less, because every other 
possesses the whole of it. … That ideas should freely spread from one to 
another over the globe, for the moral and mutual instruction of man, and 
improvement of his condition, seems to have been peculiarly and 
benevolently designed by nature, when she made them, like fire, 
expansible over all space, without lessening their density in any point.”1 
 
 Since intellectual property spreads so easily, others are able to use and build upon this 
knowledge.  People are more apt to create intellectual property if they are incentivized, and, 
therefore, they seek protection for their rights in their intellectual property.   
 The founding fathers appreciated the benefit that increased access to knowledge has on 
the greater society.
2
  They recognized that the spread of intellectual property creates innovation 
and advances in society.
3
  They agreed with Jefferson’s theory and believed that intellectual 
property can spread and promote progress and knowledge.
4
  In order to incentivize creators, they 
granted rights to creators in the Constitution.  Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution states that: 
The Congress shall have Power … [3] To regulate Commerce with foreign 
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes; … [8] 
To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for 
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
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 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, 8. 
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 Patent and copyright protection derives from clause 8, while clause 3 allows for 
protection of trademarks through Congress’ authority to regulate interstate commerce.  Clause 8 
provides patent protection through the phrase “To promote the Progress of the useful Arts, by 
securing for limited Times to Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Discoveries.”  
Clause 3 also provides the copyright protection by using the phrase “To promote the Progress of 
Science, by securing for limited Times to Authors the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings.”  Clause 3, which provides Congress power “to regulate Commerce with foreign 
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes,” enables the protection of 
trademarks, as codified in the Lanham Act.
6
 
 The substance of the creator’s right in his intellectual property is limited, however.  The 
limit and extent of the creation must be specifically known in order for protection to be granted.  
The creator’s rights will be limited to the extent to which the creator discloses his creation to the 
public.  This disclosure sets forth the metes and bounds of the covered, protectable subject 
matter. 
 This paper discusses the quid pro quo of disclosure in exchange for a creator’s exclusive 
rights in his intellectual property.  There is an underappreciated disclosure requirement among 
legal scholars and the courts for all intellectual property subjects (copyright, trademark, and 
patent).  Legal scholars and courts readily agree that there is a disclosure requirement for patents, 
but they do not find a corresponding disclosure requirement in either copyright or trademark law. 
This paper argues that scholars and courts should recognize a disclosure requirement in 
copyright law and trademark law, in addition to the already accepted disclosure requirement in 
patent law.  Part II of this paper will discuss the disclosure requirement in patent law.  Part III 
will demonstrate that there is a disclosure requirement in copyright law.  Part IV will 
demonstrate that there is a disclosure requirement in trademark law.   
II. Patent Disclosure Requirements 
In exchange for exclusive rights in a patent, the patent owner must disclose his invention to 
the public.  In order to receive the exclusive, protectable rights in his patent (for a limited time), 
the inventor must meet the disclosure requirements set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 112:  1) written 
description, 2) enablement requirement, 3) best mode requirement, and 4) the requirement that 
the patent applicant particularly point out and distinctly claim the invention.  The Supreme Court 
and lower courts have solidified this requirement for attaining patent rights.  Therefore, courts 
are solidly in agreement that in order to attain exclusive rights in a patent, the inventor must 
provide public disclosure. 
When one receives a patent, the rights he obtains are “a grant to the patentee, his heirs or 
assigns, of the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the 
invention throughout the United States or importing the invention into the United States.”7  The 
extent and limit of the protection in the patent is disclosed in the patent specification.  The rights 
in a patent are significant because an inventor receives the exclusive, protectable rights in his 
patent for twenty years.
8
 
The disclosure requirement sets out the exact invention for which the applicant wants 
exclusive rights.  In exchange for these exclusive rights, the information is publicly disclosed, so 
that others may use this patented material in the future in order to promote progress in the useful 
arts.  The United States Supreme Court stated that: 
                                                          
6
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“[t]he limits of a patent must be known for the protection of the patentee, 
the encouragement of the inventive genius of others and the assurance that 
the subject of the patent will be dedicated ultimately to the public.  
Otherwise, a zone of uncertainty which enterprise and experimentation 
may enter only at the risk of infringement claims would discourage 
invention only a little less than unequivocal foreclosure of the field, and 
the public would be deprived of rights supposed to belong to it, without 
being clearly told what it is that limits these rights.”9  
The patent specification specifies four distinct disclosure requirements for obtaining a patent:  
(1) written description, (2) enablement requirement, (3) best mode requirement, and (4) that the 
applicant particularly point out and distinctly claim the invention.
10
  The patent’s disclosure 
establishes the scope and limit of the patent’s claimed subject matter.  Each requirement within 
the patent specification is designed to provide notice to the public of the invention for which the 
inventor seeks protectable rights. 
First, the written description establishes the invention’s boundaries for two reasons:  (1) to 
notify third parties, so that they are able to develop improvements and obtain protection for their 
inventions that build upon the inventor’s patent, and (2) to limit the inventor’s ability to seek 
patent protection for broader subject matter than that which he disclosed.
11
  The United States 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit stated that “the applicant must also convey with 
reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that … he or she was in possession of the 
invention.”12  The Federal Circuit also stated that drawings alone may satisfy the written 
requirement, as long as the drawings were sufficient to notify an ordinary person skilled in the 
art as to what the invention is.
13
  
Second, the enablement requirement discloses to the public how to make and use the 
invention, so that others are able to improve upon the invention, as well as make and use the 
invention after the patent expires.
14
  By meeting the enablement requirement, the applicant also 
demonstrates that he was in possession of the invention at the time of filing.
15
  The enablement 
requirement requires that enough information be given in order for an ordinary person skilled in 
the art to make and use the invention to its full scope.
16
 
Third, the best mode requirement adds an additional level of transparency to the disclosure 
requirement:  not only how to make and use the invention, but also the best way to do so.  In 
determining the best mode requirement, the Federal Circuit created a two part test:  (1) whether 
at the time of the filing, the inventor knew of a mode of practicing his invention that he 
                                                          
9
 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 390, 116 S. Ct. 1384, 1396, 134 L. Ed. 2d 577 (1996) 
(internal citations omitted). 
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 CFMT, Inc. v. Yieldup Int'l Corp., 349 F.3d 1333, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
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considered to be better than any other, and (2) if the inventor disclosed that which he knew to be 
the best mode.
17
  The Federal Circuit explained that the best mode does not have to be the actual 
best way to do something, assuming there is one, but rather only that which is “contemplated by 
the inventor.”18   
Fourth, the disclosure requirement for patents requires that the applicant must particularly 
point out and distinctly claim the invention.  This requirement establishes the limits of the claim 
and prevents the inventor from seeking protection for inventions broader than he discloses.  The 
Federal Circuit explained that “the primary purpose of the requirement is “to guard against 
unreasonable advantages to the patentee and disadvantages to others arising from uncertainty as 
to their [respective] rights.”19  
Therefore, the four distinct disclosure requirements (written description, enablement 
requirement, best mode, and particularly point out and distinctly claim) are the quid pro quo for 
an inventor to receive exclusive, protectable rights for his invention for twenty years.  An 
inventor can receive the exclusive rights in his invention, but he must share the invention with 
the public, in order to promote the progress of the useful arts. 
In 1974, the Supreme Court explained the disclosure requirement.
20
  In Kewanee Oil, the 
plaintiffs sued defendants for misappropriation of trade secrets.
21
  Defendants were former 
employees of one of the plaintiff’s subsidiaries.22  While working for the plaintiff’s subsidiary, 
the defendants developed processes for the growth and encapsulation of synthetic crystals, 
eventually growing, for the first time, a 17-inch crystal for detecting ionizing radiation.
23
  While 
at the subsidiary, defendants signed non-disclosure agreements for any confidential information 
or trade secrets acquired.  Several defendants left the subsidiary to form Bicron Corporation, and 
others joined Bicron later as employees.  Soon after Bicron was created, it successfully grew a 
17-inch crystal of its own.
24
  The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review whether state trade 
secret protection is pre-empted by federal patent law.  In so doing, the Court analyzed the 
disclosure requirement for patent law.  The Court stated that “the patent laws impose upon the 
inventor a requirement of disclosure.”25  The Court reasoned that disclosure was necessary “[t]o 
ensure adequate and full disclosure[,] so that upon the expiration of the 17-year period, the 
knowledge of the invention enures to the people, who are thus enabled without restriction to 
practice it and profit by its use.”26  The Court explained that the patent laws promote the 
“Progress of Science and the useful Arts by offering a right of exclusion for a limited period of 
time as an incentive to inventors to risk the often enormous costs in terms of time, research, and 
development.
27
 The Court characterized the quid pro quo as the “reward for inventions,”28 and in 
order for an inventor to attain the quid pro quo, the patent law requires disclosure of the 
invention.   
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 Id. at 480. 
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The Supreme Court again explained the disclosure requirement in 1998.
29
  In Pfaff, the 
plaintiff was asked by Texas Instruments to develop a socket device for mounting and removing 
semi-conductor chip carriers.
30
  Plaintiff prepared detailed engineering drawings in order to 
make the socket, and reduced his invention to practice.
31
  After the patent issued, plaintiff sued 
Wells Electronics for patent infringement.
32
  The Court explained the disclosure requirement by 
stating that “the patent system represents a carefully crafted bargain that encourages both the 
creation and the public disclosure of new and useful advances in technology.”33  The Court 
reasoned that disclosure furthers the progress of science by granting to the inventor exclusive, 
protectable rights in his invention.  The Court stated that “the exclusive right and liberty to make 
and use and vend to others to be used [in] their own inventions, … and as matter of 
compensation to the inventors for their labor, toil, and expense in making the inventions, and 
reducing the same to practice for the public benefit, as contemplated by the Constitution and 
sanctioned by the laws of Congress.”34  
The Federal Circuit also explained the disclosure requirement needed in order for an inventor 
to achieve exclusive rights in his patent.
35
  In Ariad Pharmaceuticals, plaintiffs brought a patent 
infringement action.  The Federal Circuit explained that a “separate requirement to describe 
one’s invention is basic to patent law.”36  The Federal Circuit explained that the quid pro quo for 
exclusive, protectable rights in a patent is the written disclosure of the patent.
37
  The Federal 
Circuit reasoned that written disclosure “allows the United States Patent and Trademark Office 
(“PTO”) to examine applications effectively; courts to understand the invention, determine 
compliance with the statute, and to construe the claims; and the public to understand and 
improve upon the invention and to avoid the claimed boundaries of the patentee's exclusive 
rights.”38 
The Federal Circuit later explained that the disclosure requirement is needed in order for an 
inventor to receive the quid pro quo of exclusive rights in patent law.
39
  In Pozen, the plaintiff 
developed a method for treating migraine headaches by combining two drugs into a single 
tablet.
40
  Plaintiff acquired three patents for the new drug, Treximet.
41
  Plaintiff sued defendants, 
generic pharmaceutical manufacturers, for marketing generic versions of Treximet prior to the 
expiration of Pozen’s patents.42  In reviewing Pozen’s infringement claim, the Federal Circuit 
explained the written description requirement necessary to achieve the quid pro quo of exclusive 
rights in the patent.  The Federal Circuit explained that in order to achieve exclusive rights, the 
inventor must fully disclose his invention, in order to promote the progress of science.
43
  The 
Federal Circuit explained that the written description is a requirement, so that the specification 
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 Id. at 59. 
33
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40
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 Id. at 1167. 
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adequately describes an invention, such that it reasonably conveys to a person of ordinary skill in 
the art that the inventor had possession of the claimed invention.
44
  In return for the disclosure, 
the inventor will achieve the exclusive rights of the patent. 
It is undisputed that there is a disclosure requirement in patent law.  Courts have solidified 
that the specification requirements laid out in 35 U.S.C. § 112 are needed in order for an inventor 
to receive exclusive rights in his invention.  By providing the written description, enablement 
requirement, best mode requirement, and particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the 
invention, the inventor meets the disclosure requirement.  The disclosure requirements in § 112 
are the quid pro quo needed for the exclusive rights.   
III. Case for Copyright Disclosure Requirements 
There is an overall misunderstanding that copyright law does not have a disclosure 
requirement.  I argue that there is an underappreciated disclosure requirement in copyright law:  
Copyright registration.  Scholarship is full of criticism contrary to the existence of a public 
disclosure requirement for copyrights.  However, just as in patent law, the purpose of the 
disclosure requirement is to establish the metes and bounds of the protection requested by the 
creator for his copyrighted work.  The protection granted will enable others to build upon the 
works, and after the protection expires, to use the work itself.  Additionally, fixation in a tangible 
medium of expression does not meet the level of disclosure needed to receive exclusive rights in 
one’s copyrightable work.  Fixation merely makes something copyrightable.  Therefore, I argue 
that in order for the author to receive exclusive rights in copyright, his quid pro quo for 
disclosure is to have his work registered in the Copyright Office.   
The owner of copyrighted material has the following rights in his copyrighted work:   
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; 
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work; 
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the 
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or 
lending; 
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, 
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform 
the copyrighted work publicly; 
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, 
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the 
individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display 
the copyrighted work publicly; and 
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work 




The duration of the rights is even more significant than for patent protection.  The exclusive 
rights for a copyright owner extend for the life of the author, plus 70 years.
46
 
In order for an author to have a copyright in his work, the only requirements are fixation in a 
tangible medium of expression.
47
  Once an author has fixed his expression of an idea onto a 
tangible medium of expression, even for a transitory time, his work is copyrightable.  However, 




 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2002). 
46
 17 U.S.C. § 302 (1998). 
47
 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1990). 
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if an author wants to enforce his rights in his copyrighted work as to against all others (his quid 
pro quo), his work must be registered.  Therefore, an author may technically have a copyright 
once the expression is fixed in a tangible medium of expression; however, he has no enforceable 
rights in the copyright until the copyright has been registered.  Hence, the quid pro quo for 
exclusive rights in his copyrighted work is disclosure, and the disclosure requirement of 
copyrighted works is the registration of the copyright.   
The scholarship is ripe with examples rebuking the notion that copyright law contains no 
disclosure requirement.  Professor John Cady stated that “unlike patent law, copyright law does 
not have a disclosure requirement.”48  Professor Richard Zerbe explained that “[copyright rights] 
are granted without a disclosure requirement because copyright protection attaches once the 
work is fixed in a tangible medium of expression.”49  He also explained that “this missing 
disclosure requirement is an aberration of the copyright law.”50  Professor Sharon Sandeen added 
that “the Copyright Act does not require authors to publicly disclose their works.”51  David 
Leuttgen explained that “copyright law does not need disclosure requirements because of the 
very fact that the subject matter of copyright is communicative.”52  Stephen Davidson added that 
“unlike the patent laws, the objective of the copyright laws is not disclosure, but rather the 
reduction of ideas to original forms of expression.”53  Further, Brett Frischmann and Dan Moylan 
added that there is an “absence of an explicit disclosure requirement in copyright law.”54 
This belief is not quite correct.  If the owner of a copyrighted work wants protection for his 
copyrighted works, he must publicly disclose that for which he wants protection.  This 
requirement is no different than the requirement for patent protection.  In order for an inventor to 
receive rights in his patent, he must disclose the limits and scope of the invention.
55
  This would 
be analogous to an inventor who did not disclose his patent, according to the requirements of the 
patent law, attempting to later claim patent rights on another’s invention after that other’s work 
has been created.  The inventor attempting to enforce rights would be barred from claiming he 
had patent protection, since he did not meet the disclosure requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112.  The 
same bar applies for copyrighted works.  The owner of a copyrighted work must have made 
public disclosure of the subject matter for which he wants protection.  That public disclosure is 
given through the registration requirement for copyrights. 
Congress has made it clear that there is a public disclosure requirement for copyrighted work.  
The Copyright Act states that “no civil action for infringement of the copyright in any United 
States work shall be instituted until preregistration or registration of the copyright claim has been 
made in accordance with this title.”56  This requirement bars anyone who has not met the public 
                                                          
48
 John Cady, Copyrighting Computer Programs: Distinguishing Expression from Ideas, 22 Temp. Envtl. L. & 
Tech. J. 15, 35 (2003). 
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 Lawrence D. Graham & Richard O. Zerbe, Jr., Economically Efficient Treatment of Computer Software: Reverse 
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 Id. at 124.  
51
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and Its Application to Software, 15 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 865, 877 (2000). 
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disclosure requirement from bringing an action against another for rights in the copyright, further 
strengthening the quid pro quo of exclusive rights with disclosure. 
Court after court has solidified the registration requirement.  The Supreme Court has held 
that a precondition to enforcing an owner’s rights in copyright (by filing a copyright 
infringement claim) is the Copyright Act’s registration requirement.57  Circuit courts have 




Therefore, it is undisputable that there is a disclosure requirement in copyright law in order 
for a copyright owner to attain the quid pro quo of exclusive rights in his copyrighted work:  
Copyright registration.  Just as in patent law, an author can receive exclusive rights in his 
copyrighted work, but he must first share the work with the public, in order to promote the 
progress of science.  
In order for an author to have his work registered, he must have fixed his expression in a 
tangible medium for longer than a transitory duration.  Hence, while his work may be 
copyrightable once it is fixed in a tangible medium, the author does not attain exclusive, 
protectable rights in his copyright until the copyrighted work is registered.  
The Supreme Court has set forth the pre-condition of registration, prior to an author 
obtaining protectable copyright rights.
59
  In Reed Elsevier, the plaintiffs were freelance authors 
who sued defendant publishers for infringement because the publishers had electronically printed 
their works without prior permission.
60
  While some of the works were registered, there were 
works that were not registered.
61
  The Court explained that Congress is given power ““[t]o 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors ... the 
exclusive Right to ... their ... Writings.” Art. I, § 8, cl. 8.”62  The Court cited Section 411(a) of the 
Copyright Act by stating that “no civil action for infringement of the copyright in any United 
States work shall be instituted until preregistration or registration of the copyright claim has been 
made in accordance with this title.”63  The Court went on to hold that Section 411(a) imposes a 
precondition to filing a claim.
64
   
The Seventh Circuit also weighed in on the fact that registration is required prior to an author 
attaining rights in a copyrightable work.
65
  In Johnson, plaintiff was a singer-songwriter who 
sued defendants that used a portion of his song in their own song.
66
  Plaintiff, however, never 
                                                          
57
 Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237 (2010). 
58
 See Airframe Sys., Inc. v. L-3 Communications Corp., 658 F.3d 100, 105 (1st Cir. 2011) (“proof of registration of 
the allegedly infringed work remains an element[ ] of a cause of action for copyright infringement” (internal 
citations omitted)); Johnson v. Cypress Hill, 641 F.3d 867, 873 (7th Cir. 2011) (“the copyright registration 
requirement of 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) is a precondition to filing a claim”); Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v. IAC/Interactivecorp., 
606 F.3d 612, 615 (9th Cir. 2010) cert. denied 131 S. Ct. 686 (U.S. 2010) (“[s]ection 411(a)'s registration 
requirement is a pre-condition to filing a claim”); and Kernel Records Oy v. Mosley, 694 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2012) 
(“although registration is not a condition of copyright protection, registration or a refusal of registration of a United 
States work is a prerequisite for bringing an action for copyright infringement. 17 U.S.C.A. § 408(a).”). 
59
 Id. at 1247. 
60




 Id. at 1241. 
63
 Id. at 1245. 
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 Id. at 1247. 
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 Johnson v. Cypress Hill, 641 F.3d 867 (7th Cir. 2011). 
66
 Id. at 869. 
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registered the copyright of his song.
67
  The Seventh Circuit explained that in order for a song to 
be entitled to copyright protection, the copyright must be registered.
68
  The Seventh Circuit 
explained that a necessary precondition to filing a copyright infringement claim is that the 
copyright be registered in accordance with 17 U.S.C. § 411(a).
69
 
The Eleventh Circuit also reviewed the requirement of copyright registration in order for a 
copyright owner to have rights in the copyrighted work.
70
  In Oravec, the copyright owner sued 
architects and several developers for copyright infringement.
71
  The Eleventh Circuit explained 
that the goal of copyright protection is to encourage creation of original works, while promoting 
the free flow of ideas and information.
72
  Further, the Eleventh Circuit held that registration is a 
prerequisite for an infringement action.
73
 
Protection is provided for authors, in order to promote the Constitutional goal of the progress 
of science.  Therefore, in order for one to attain protectable, enforceable rights in his 
copyrightable work, there is a quid pro quo requirement that his work must be registered.  
Registration discloses to the world that the specific work that is requested to be protected under 
copyright law.  Hence, just as in patent law, there is a disclosure requirement for copyright, even 
though scholars disagree. 
Therefore, I argue that copyright registration is an underappreciated disclosure requirement 
in copyright law.  Although scholarship decries the existence of a public disclosure requirement 
for copyrights, the courts’ holdings state otherwise.    If a copyright owner wants to receive 
exclusive rights in his work, he must dictate the metes and bounds of his work, so that others 
may build upon the work and use the work itself after the protection expires.  Further, fixation in 
a tangible medium of expression does not meet the level of disclosure needed to receive 
exclusive rights in one’s copyrightable work.  Thus, in order for the owner of a copyrightable 
work to receive exclusive rights in copyright, his quid pro quo for disclosure is to have his work 
registered in the Copyright Office.   
IV. Case for Trademark Disclosure Requirements 
Similarly to copyright law, there is lack of appreciation that trademark law has a disclosure 
requirement.  I argue that the quid pro quo disclosure requirement needed to receive exclusive 
rights in a trademark is actual use in interstate commerce.  Protection of trademark rights derives 
from the Commerce Clause of the Constitution.  The scholarly belief is that trademark law 
contains no disclosure requirement.  Once again, just as in copyright and patent law, the purpose 
of the disclosure requirement is to establish the metes and bounds of the protection requested by 
the creator for his mark.  The disclosure of the mark to the public occurs when the mark is used 
in interstate commerce.  The requirement that an applicant have a duty of candor to the Patent 
and Trademark Office does not meet the disclosure requirement of actual use.  Additionally, 
although trademarks are able to be registered, registration does not meet the required level of 
public disclosure needed to receive protectable, exclusive rights.  Thus, in trademark law, the 
quid pro quo for exclusive, protectable rights in trademark is the actual use of the mark in 
interstate commerce. 
                                                          
67
 Id. at 870. 
68
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Trademark protection is given through the Congress’ power to regulate Commerce among 
the several States.
74
  The Lanham Act gives owners of trademarks exclusive, protectable rights 
for protection against the unauthorized use of their trademarks.  The pertinent text reads  
(1) Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant-- 
(a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable 
imitation of a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for 
sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or in 
connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to 
cause mistake, or to deceive; or 
(b) reproduce, counterfeit, copy, or colorably imitate a registered mark 
and apply such reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation 
to labels, signs, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles or 
advertisements intended to be used in commerce upon or in connection 
with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of goods or 
services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause 
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive, 
shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant for the remedies 
hereinafter provided. Under subsection (b) hereof, the registrant shall not 
be entitled to recover profits or damages unless the acts have been 
committed with knowledge that such imitation is intended to be used to 
cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive. 
15 U.S.C. § 1114. 
 
The jurisdictional hook of interstate commerce was incorporated in the language of the 
Lanham Act.  Congress explained that “[t]he word “commerce” means all commerce which may 
lawfully be regulated by Congress.”75  Therefore, the ability for a trademark owner to attain 
exclusive rights in his mark derives from Art. I, Sec. 8, cl. 3 of the Constitution. 
The duration of the rights in trademarks is potentially the longest of any intellectual property 
subject matter.  The exclusive rights for a trademark owner could possibly extend to perpetuity.
76
  
In order to attain these rights, the quid pro quo of disclosure is required.  For trademark law, the 
disclosure requirement is actual use in interstate commerce. 
As in copyright law, the scholarly belief is that there is no disclosure requirement for 
trademarks.  There is a large amount of scholarly criticism that trademark law does not have a 
disclosure requirement.  In stating that there was no disclosure requirement for trademarks, 
Vincent Palladino argued for a disclosure requirement for trademarks.
77
  Michael Weicher also 
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suggested for a disclosure requirement for trademarks.
78
  In hearings before Senate, it was 
suggested that a disclosure requirement be added to the Lanham Act.
79
  Also, Brian Peterman 
proposed a disclosure requirement for trademark protection.
80
  Palladino, Weicher, and Peterman 
argue that trademarks should be disclosed to the public, so that consumers are able to identify the 
source of the goods and services.  They argue that this disclosure will lead consumers to not be 
confused in the marketplace.  However, actual use in interstate commerce already serves the 
purpose of identifying the source of goods and services. 
Some may argue that the requirement in the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) that 
applicants have complete candor constitutes a disclosure requirement.  The case usually cited as 
establishing a duty of candor in the PTO is T.A.D. Avanti, Inc. v. Phone-Mate, Inc., 199 U.S.P.Q. 
648 (C.D. Cal. 1978).  In T.A.D. Avanti, the court explained that the plaintiff’s president could 
not have vouched for the mark in his registration, and therefore, the court invalidated the 
registration.  The court explained the following: 
 “[a]n applicant for registration of a trademark is required to exercise 
uncompromising candor in his communications with the United States 
Patent and Trademark Office, lest any registration he obtains will be 
invalid and/or unenforceable. He must not only refrain from making false 
representations to the United States Patent and Trademark Office, but 
must make full disclosure of all facts to his knowledge which might bear 
in any way on the Office's decision to grant the registration sought.” 
 
Id. at 655. 
The court made clear that the duty of candor only refers to knowledge which might bear on the 
PTO’s registration decision.  The duty of candor, though, does not create an affirmative 
disclosure requirement for content of the trademark sought. 
The duty to candor to the PTO, therefore, would not rise to the level of disclosure necessary 
to constitute public disclosure.  Professor Susan Richey explained the fallacy that the duty of 
candor could rise to the level of a disclosure requirement.
81
  Professor Richey explained that the 
applicant’s duty of candor does not equate to an affirmative duty to disclose facts material to 
registration proceedings before the United States Patent and Trademark Office.
82
  Professor 
Richey further explained that the Lanham Act is silent on the issue of disclosure.
83
  She 
concluded that “the obligation not to lie is different than an affirmative obligation to produce 
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relevant information.”84  Additionally, Professor Richey provided numerous examples where 
case law explained that the duty of candor is not equivalent to public disclosure of the 
trademark.
85
   
Another argument that may be made is that trademark registration could meet the public 
disclosure requirement.  Like copyrights, trademarks are able to be registered.
86
  However, 
trademark registration is not a public disclosure requirement; rather, registration merely provides 
the presumption of validity of a trademark.
87
  The Fifth Circuit explained this concept.
88
  In 
Amazing Spaces, the plaintiff brought an action for trade dress infringement for defendant’s use 
of the mark.
89
  The Fifth Circuit explained that “proof of the registration of a mark with the PTO 
constitutes prima facie evidence that the mark is valid and that the registrant has the exclusive 
right to use the registered mark in commerce with respect to the specified goods or services.”90  
The Ninth Circuit expanded on the presumption.
91
  In Zobmondo, the Ninth Circuit explained 
that the presumption of validity is a “strong one.”92  
Besides there existing a strong presumption of validity, trademark registration also provides 
benefits for registration.  The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals explained the benefits of 
registration.
93
  In In re McGinley, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals stated that the 
benefits of registration:  
“include public notice of the mark in an official government publication 
and in official records which are distributed throughout the world, 
maintenance of permanent public records concerning the mark, 
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availability of Customs Service for blocking importation of infringing 
goods, access to federal courts where there is a presumption of validity of 
the registration ..., notices to the registrant concerning maintenance of the 
registration, and, to some extent, direct government protection of the mark 
in that the PTO searches its records and refuses registration to others of 
conflicting marks. Apart from nominal fees, these costs are underwritten 
by public funds.”  
 
In re Robert L. McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 486 (CCPA 1981). 
The Fourth Circuit also explained some of the benefits conferred by trademark registration.  The 
Fourth Circuit explained that “registration confers certain benefits on the owner, such as serving 
as prima facie evidence of the mark's validity and entitling the owner of the mark to proceed on 
an in rem basis under the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA).”94  In light of 
the presumption of validity and the benefits that registration provides, registration is encouraged 
as one of the purposes of the Lanham Act.
95
   
 Although trademark registration provides a rebuttable presumption of validity, as well as 
numerous benefits, registration does not satisfy the disclosure that trademark protection requires.  
In order to attain the quid pro quo of exclusive, protectable rights in a trademark, the trademark 
owner must publicly disclose the trademark by actual use in commerce.  The Fourth Circuit 
elaborated on this principle.
96
  The Fourth Circuit explained that “it is the use of a mark, not its 
registration, that confers trademark protection.”97   
Therefore, it follows that there is a disclosure requirement as a quid pro quo in exchange for 
exclusive rights for trademark protection:  actual use the mark in interstate commerce.  The level 
of usage must meet a statutory level:  “the bona fide use of a mark in the ordinary course of 
trade, and not made merely to reserve a right in a mark.”98  Congress explained its reasoning in 
the Lanham Act: 
The intent of this chapter is to regulate commerce within the control of 
Congress by making actionable the deceptive and misleading use of marks 
in such commerce; to protect registered marks used in such commerce 
from interference by State, or territorial legislation; to protect persons 
engaged in such commerce against unfair competition; to prevent fraud 
and deception in such commerce by the use of reproductions, copies, 
counterfeits, or colorable imitations of registered marks; and to provide 
rights and remedies stipulated by treaties and conventions respecting 
trademarks, trade names, and unfair competition entered into between the 
United States and foreign nations. 




 See Aluminum Fabricating Co. of Pittsburgh v. Season-All Window Corp., 259 F.2d 314, 316 (2d Cir. 1958) 
(stating that “one of the purposes of the Lanham Act was to encourage registration of trademarks and other marks.”).  
See also In re Int'l Flavors & Fragrances, Inc., 183 F.3d 1361, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (stating that “one of the policies 
sought to be implemented by the Act was to encourage the presence on the register of trademarks of as many as 
possible of the marks in actual use so that they are available for search purposes.”).  See also Id. at 1367 (stating that 
these additional protections are granted by the Lanham Act to encourage trademark owners to register their marks 
with the PTO.”). 
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 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006). 
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15 U.S.C. § 1127. 
 
The Second Circuit explained that protection for rights in trademark emanate from the 
mark’s actual use in commerce.99  In United We Stand, plaintiff brought a trademark 
infringement action against defendants for its mark.
100
  The Second Circuit explained that “use in 
commerce” denotes Congress’ authority under the Commerce Clause, U.S. Const., Art. I, § 1, cl. 
3, to regulate the use of trademarks.
101
  The Second Circuit explained that in order for a 
trademark owner to obtain protectable, enforceable rights in his mark, the quid pro quo for 
protection required that the mark must be used in commerce.
102
  In requiring an actual use in 
commerce, a trademark owner must publicly disclose to the public his trademark if he wishes to 
receive protection for the mark.  
The Ninth Circuit also explained that use in commerce is a prerequisite to obtaining 
protectable rights in the mark.
103
  In Levi Strauss, plaintiff brought a trademark infringement 
action against defendant for its stitching design.
104
  The Ninth Circuit explained that “[t]he owner 
of a famous mark shall be entitled ... to an injunction against another person's commercial use in 
commerce of a mark or trade name, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2005).”105  The Ninth Circuit explained 
that a trademark owner obtains protectable rights in his mark through actual use in commerce.
106
  
The owner’s ability to attain protectable rights apply only after the mark has been used in 
commerce, or publicly disclosed. 
Another Ninth Circuit case describes the use in commerce requirement for obtaining the quid 
pro quo of protectable rights under trademark law.
107
  In  Karl Storz Endoscopy, the 
manufacturer of rigid endoscopes brought a trademark infringement suit against a repair 
company.
108
  In evaluating the plaintiff’s right in his trademark, the Ninth Circuit stated that in 
order for a mark to be protectable, it must have been used in interstate commerce.
109
  The Ninth 
Circuit even went on to describe what constitutes “use in commerce.”110  The Ninth Cicuit stated 
that “a mark is used in commerce when (1) the mark has been placed on the goods or their 
containers, labels or the documents associated with the goods or their sale, and (2) the goods are 
‘sold or transported in commerce.’  15 U.S.C. § 1127.”111  The reason that a mark must be used 
in commerce in order to attain protectable rights is that the mark must be disclosed to the public 
through actual use in commerce. 
District Courts have also added to the reasoning for the use in commerce requirement.
112
  In 
S Industries, the Northern District of Illinois explained why use in commerce is required in order 
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for one to attain protectable rights in the mark.
113
  The Northern District of Illinois stated that 
“[u]nder the common law, ownership is conferred on ‘the person who employs the first actual 
use of a mark in a genuine commercial transaction.’”114  The reason for the first actual use is that 
in order for a trademark owner to attain protection in his mark, his mark must be publicly 
disclosed.  The court in DSMR, further explained the requirement of use in commerce.
115
  The 
court explained that in order for one to attain protectable rights in a mark, “one must win the race 
to the marketplace to establish exclusive use of the mark.”116  Once again, the court stated this in 
order to reinforce the requirement that the mark be publicly disclosed in order to attain the quid 
pro quo of trademark protection. 
Courts have further solidified that trademark protection derives from actual use in commerce.  
The granting of the exclusive rights in trademarks comes from actual use in interstate commerce.  
Courts and scholars have provided numerous examples demonstrating the fact that exclusive 
rights in trademark are allowable only after the mark has been used in interstate commerce.
117
 
Protection is provided for trademark owners through Congress’ power to regulate interstate 
commerce.  In order for a trademark owner to obtain that protection, he must publicly disclose 
his mark through the actual use of the mark in commerce.  Use of the mark in commerce 
discloses to the world the work that subject matter which is requested to be protected.  Hence, 
just as in patent law, there is a disclosure requirement for trademark law as well. 
In conclusion, the quid pro quo disclosure requirement needed to receive exclusive rights in a 
trademark is actual use in interstate commerce.  Even though the scholarly belief is that 
trademark law contains no disclosure requirement, I argue that in order for an owner of a 
trademark to obtain exclusive, protectable rights in his mark, he must use the mark in interstate 
commerce.  The actual use establishes the metes and bounds of the protection requested by the 
creator for his mark and discloses the mark to the public.  An applicant’s duty of candor to the 
Patent and Trademark Office does not satisfy the disclosure requirement of actual use.  
Additionally, trademark registration does not meet the necessary level of public disclosure 
needed to receive protectable, exclusive rights.  Thus, in trademark law, the quid pro quo for 
exclusive, protectable rights in one’s trademark is the actual use of the mark in interstate 
commerce. 
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 See Tally-Ho, Inc. v. Coast Community College Dist., 889 F.2d 1018, 1022 (11th Cir.1989) (stating that where, 
as here, neither party has registered a disputed trademark with the federal government, the parties must look to 
common law and state statutes to determine what protection they have); United States v. Steffens, 100 U.S. 82 
(1879) (stating that under the common law, trademark rights are appropriated only through actual prior use in 
commerce); J. McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 16:1, at 720 (2d Ed.1984) (explaining that 
trademark ownership is always appurtenant to commercial activity. Thus, actual and continuous use is required to 
acquire and retain a protectible interest in a mark); Elec. Communications, Inc. v. Elec. Components for Indus. Co., 
443 F.2d 487, 492 (8th Cir. 1971) (stating that the right to a trademark is acquired by appropriation and use as such, 
and actual use in commerce in connection with the goods is necessary to the acquisition of any rights. The mere 
advertisement of words or symbols without application to the goods themselves is insufficient to constitute a 
trademark); Crystal Entm't & Filmworks, Inc. v. Jurado, 643 F.3d 1313, 1321 (11th Cir. 2011) (stating that 
common-law trademark rights are appropriated only through actual prior use in commerce); United States v. 
Steffens, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879) (stating that trademark rights, under the common law, are appropriated only 
through actual prior use in commerce); In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879) (explaining that at common 




Scholars and courts are resolute in the belief that there is no disclosure requirement for 
copyright or trademark law.  However, when one wishes to exercise his rights in his intellectual 
property, the scope of the protected material must be specified.  The level of specification 
required is specified by the disclosure requirement.  In order for someone to enforce his rights in 
his copyrighted work, he must register his copyright with the Copyright Office.  Therefore, the 
disclosure requirement for copyright is copyright registration.  Similarly, in order for someone to 
enforce his rights in his trademark, he must have used his mark in commerce.  Hence, trademark 
protection is granted where a trademark owner has actually used his mark in interstate 
commerce.  Analogously, in order for someone to enforce his rights in his patent, he must have 
disclosed his invention in accordance with 12 U.S.C. § 112.  Therefore, copyright, trademark, 
and patent law all have the quid pro quo of disclosure in order to receive protection for the 
underlying intellectual property.  The fact that there is a disclosure requirement in all subjects of 
intellectual property law is underappreciated, and scholars and courts should recognize the 
existence of disclosure requirements for each. 
